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What kind of science – or, more generally, what kind of academic inquiry – can
best contribute to the public good? That is the question I tackle in this essay.
I consider two possible answers to this question, two rival conceptions of inquiry,
which I call “knowledge-inquiry” and “wisdom-inquiry”.
The basic idea of knowledge-inquiry is simply this. First, knowledge and
technological know-how are to be acquired; then, secondarily, they can be applied to
help solve social problems. On this view, a sharp split must be maintained between
the humanitarian or social aims of inquiry, and the intellectual aim (acquisition of
knowledge). The basic method is to permit into the intellectual domain of inquiry –
into academic texts, journals, lectures and seminars – only claims to knowledge, and
factors relevant to the assessment of such claims: observation, experiment and
argument. Everything else must be excluded. In particular, the intellectual activity of
articulating problems of living, and proposing and assessing possible solutions,
possible actions, must be excluded from inquiry: such intellectual activity would
involve the advocacy and assessment of such things as human needs, values and
aspirations, and political policies, programmes and philosophies. All this must be
excluded from the intellectual domain of inquiry, to ensure that the search for
genuine, objective knowledge does not degenerate into the production of mere
propaganda and ideology.
The core component of this view is a conception of science, which I shall call
“standard empiricism”. This asserts that in science laws and theories, claims to
knowledge, are to be assessed impartially with respect to the evidence, no permanent
assumption being made about the universe independent of evidence (and certainly not
in defiance of evidence). Standard empiricism imposes an even more severe line of
demarcation between science and everything else: in order to enter into the
intellectual domain of science, an idea must be empirically testable.
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Not everything that goes on in academia conforms to knowledge-inquiry. For one
thing, anti-rationalist, romantic ideas, and what Isaiah Berlin has called the “Counter-
Enlightenment”,
2 have been influential in such fields as cultural studies, the history
and sociology of science, and so-called “continental philosophy”. It may even be that
academia, as it exists today, is a kind of confused mixture of what I am calling
knowledge-inquiry and wisdom-inquiry (see below). Nevertheless, overwhelmingly,
knowledge-inquiry is dominant.
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Knowledge-inquiry is, nevertheless, damagingly irrational, in a wholesale,
structural way, when judged from the standpoint of promoting the public
good.
In order to be rational, inquiry must at least observe the following four absolutely
elementary, banal, entirely uncontroversial rules of rational problem solving.
(1) Articulate, and try to improve the articulation of, the problem to be solved.
(2) Propose and critically assess alternative possible solutions.
(3) When necessary, break up the basic problem to be solved into a number of
preliminary, simpler, analogous, subordinate or specialized problems (to be2
tackled in accordance with rules 1 and 2), in an attempt to work gradually
towards a solution to the basic problem to be solved.
(4) Interconnect attempts to solve basic and specialized problems, so that basic
problem solving may guide and be guided by specialized problem solving.
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Knowledge-inquiry, as it exists today, puts rule (3) into practice to splendid effect.
It is this that creates the multitude of disciplines, sub-disciplines, sub-sub-sub-
disciplines, that go to make up modern science, and modern academia more
generally.
5 Disastrously, knowledge-inquiry violates, rules (1), (2) and (4).
In order to see this, consider the nature of the problems that, fundamentally, we
need to solve in order to promote the public good. These are, fundamentally,
problems of living, problems of action, not problems of knowledge or technological
know-how. Even when new knowledge or technology is needed, as in medicine or
agriculture, it is always what this knowledge or technology enables us to do that
produces what is of value to us in life. It is always what we do (or refrain from doing)
that solves our problems of living.
Furthermore, in order to solve our most urgent problems of living, we need, quite
fundamentally, to discover how to resolve our conflicts and problems of living in
more just, cooperatively rational ways than we do at present. There are of course
degrees of cooperativeness, from annihilation of the opposition, at the extreme violent
end of the spectrum, via threat of annihilation, threats of a less extreme kind,
bargaining, appealing to some procedure to decide the issue such as tossing a coin or
voting, to cooperative rationality at the other end of the spectrum, all those concerned
seeking to discover that resolution of the conflict that is of most value, does the best
justice, to all those concerned. Acting cooperatively is only feasible and desirable up
to a certain point, for all sorts of reasons. Nevertheless, in our violent and unjust
world, there is room for rather more cooperative tackling of conflicts of a kind that is
both feasible and desirable (to put it at its mildest).
Put together the above four rules of reason, and the point that our problems are,
fundamentally, problems of living, problems of action, and we are led to conclude that
the intellectually fundamental tasks of a kind of inquiry rationally devoted to
promoting the public good must be to:
(1) Articulate, and try to improve the articulation of, our most urgent,
fundamental problems of living (individual, social, global).
(2) Propose and critically assess alternative possible solutions – alternative
possible actions, policies, plans, political programmes, philosophies of life.
But it is just these two intellectually fundamental tasks which knowledge-inquiry
cannot perform, and must exclude from the intellectual domain of inquiry, as we have
seen above. Just that which a kind of inquiry devoted to promoting the public good
most needs to do, cannot be done. Knowledge-inquiry violates rules (1) and (2) of
rational problem solving – the most basic rules of reason conceivable. Rule (3), as we
have seen, is put splendidly into effect, but rule (4) is violated as well. Because
tackling of problems of living cannot go on within knowledge-inquiry, at a
fundamental level, the rule (4) task of inter-connecting fundamental and specialized
problem-solving cannot go on either. In short, three of the four most elementary,
uncontroversial rules of reason conceivable are violated in a wholesale, structural
fashion.
And this gross irrationality, built into the intellectual-institutional structure of
academic inquiry, has profoundly damaging social, humanitarian consequences. It
means that knowledge is pursued in a way that is dissociated from any more3
fundamental intellectual concern to help humanity discover how to resolve its
conflicts and social problems in more cooperatively rational ways.
Scientific knowledge and technological know-how have enormously increased our
power to act. In endless ways, this vast increase in our power to act has been used for
the public good – in health, agriculture, transport, communications, and countless
other ways. But equally, this enhanced power to act has been used to cause human
harm, whether unintentionally, as in environmental damage (at least initially), or
intentionally, as in war. It is hardly too much to say that all our current global
problems have come about because of science and technology. The appalling
destructiveness of modern warfare and terrorism, vast inequalities in wealth and
standards of living between first and third worlds, rapid population growth,
environmental damage – destruction of tropical rain forests, rapid extinction of
species, global warming, pollution of sea, earth and air, depletion of finite natural
resources – all exist today because of modern science and technology. Science and
technology lead to modern industry and agriculture, to modern medicine and hygiene,
and thus in turn to population growth, to modern armaments, conventional, chemical,
biological and nuclear, to destruction of natural habitats, extinction of species,
pollution, and to immense inequalities of wealth across the globe. The successful
pursuit of knowledge and know-how, dissociated from a more fundamental concern to
help humanity learn how to resolve its conflicts and problems of living in more just,
cooperatively rational ways, is almost bound to lead to such adverse consequences.
And priorities of scientific research are unlikely to reflect the priorities of human
need. Science without wisdom is a recipe for disaster.
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What, then, in broad outline, would academic inquiry be like if it was rationally
designed and devoted to helping humanity make progress towards a good world? I
now give a sketch of this kind of inquiry, which I shall call “wisdom-inquiry”. There
is nothing arbitrary about this sketch. It is arrived at by modifying knowledge-inquiry
just sufficiently to ensure that the above four rules of reason are all implemented.
At the heart of wisdom-inquiry there is the intellectually fundamental activity of
(1) articulating problems of living, and (2) proposing and critically assessing possible
solutions - possible increasingly cooperative actions (policies, political programmes,
institutional changes, philosophies of life). This intellectually fundamental activity is
undertaken by social inquiry: see diagram 1. The basic task of social inquiry is to
promote more cooperatively rational resolving of problems of living in the social
world: acquisition of knowledge of social phenomena is a subsidiary task. Wisdom-
inquiry also (3) tackles a vast mass of more specialized, subordinate problems of
knowledge and technological know-how, pursued by the natural, technological and
formal sciences, but (4) such specialized problem-solving is interconnected with
fundamental problem-solving, so that each may influence the other: see diagram 1.
Wisdom-inquiry acts as a kind of people’s civil service, doing openly for the public
what actual civil services are supposed to do in secret for governments. According to
this view, academic inquiry must have just sufficient power (but no more) to retain its
independence from government, industry, the press, public opinion, and other centres
of power and influence in the social world. Wisdom-inquiry learns from, seeks to
educate, and argues with the great social world beyond, but does not dictate.
Academic thought may itself be regarded as a specialized, subordinate part of what is
really important and fundamental: the thinking that goes on, individually, socially and
institutionally, in the social world, guiding individual, social and institutional actions
and life. It is vital that the relationship between socially active thought and academic
thought itself puts rule (4) into practice, each influencing the other.4
Granted that academic inquiry as it exists at present really is as grossly and
damagingly irrational as I have argued it is, the question arises: How did this come
about? The answer lies with the Enlightenment of the 18
th century, which sought to
develop social inquiry as social science rather than social methodology or social
philosophy. The philosophes of the Enlightenment had the magnificent idea that it
might be possible to learn from scientific progress how to achieve social progress
towards an enlightened world. In order to implement this idea properly it is essential
to (a) characterize correctly the progress-achieving methods of science, (b) generalize
these methods properly and (c) apply them to the task of making social progress
towards a good world. This involves, first, recognizing that standard empiricism is
untenable: science is impossible unless basic assumptions are made concerning the
knowability and comprehensibility of the universe. The fundamental aim of science is
deeply problematic; science needs to represent its aims and methods in the form of a
hierarchy, aims becoming increasingly unproblematic as one goes up the hierarchy, in
this way a framework of fixed aims and methods being created within which more
problematic aims and methods can be improved with improving knowledge. This
interplay between improving knowledge and improving aims and methods (improving
knowledge about how to improve knowledge) is the crux of scientific rationality, and
the key to the success of science.
7 It is this conception of scientific method that needs
to be generalized and applied to the task of making social progress towards a good,
civilized world – a task with a notoriously problematic aim. The outcome would be
wisdom-inquiry, with social inquiry pursued as social methodology or social
philosophy.
Unfortunately, the Enlightenment got all three steps, (a), (b) and (c) wrong. The
philosophes upheld versions of standard empiricism, and sought to develop social
inquiry as social science. This was developed throughout the 19
th century, and built
into academia in the 20
th century with the creation of departments of social science.
The upshot is what we have today, damagingly irrational knowledge-inquiry.
We urgently need to bring about a revolution in the aims and methods of academic
inquiry, so that wisdom-inquiry is put into academic practice, and a more
intellectually rigorous and humanly desirable kind of inquiry is developed than that
which we have at present.
8 The fundamental aim would be to promote wisdom, help
humanity create a wiser world. But what, it may be asked, do I mean by “wisdom”?
Elsewhere I have defined wisdom like this:
“[Wisdom is] the desire, the active endeavour, and the capacity to discover and
achieve what is desirable and of value in life, both for oneself and for others.
Wisdom includes knowledge and understanding but goes beyond them in also
including: the desire and active striving for what is of value, the ability to see what
is of value, actually and potentially, in the circumstances of life, the ability to
experience value, the capacity to use and develop knowledge, technology and
understanding as needed for the realization of value. Wisdom, like knowledge, can
be conceived of, not only personal terms, but also in institutional or social terms.
We can thus interpret [wisdom-inquiry] as asserting: the basic task of rational
inquiry is to help us develop wiser ways of living, wiser institutions, customs and
social relations, a wiser world.” (Maxwell, 1984, p. 66.)
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Notes
1 This is in essence Karl Popper’s famous criterion of demarcation between science
and metaphysics: in order to be scientific, a theory must be falsifiable. See, for
example, Popper (1963, ch. 11).
2 Berlin (1980, pp. 1-24).
3 For evidence in support of this claim see Maxwell: (1984, ch. 6); (1998, pp. 38-45);
(2002a, pp. 240-1).
4 For further rules of reason, and further discussion of the nature of rational problem-
solving and aim-pursuing see Maxwell (1984, chs. 4 and 5).
5 In order to get a sense of just how endless is the maze of specialized sub-sub-sub-
disciplines in a field such as physics or chemistry, one need only consult a volume of
Physics Abstracts.
6 For a detailed discussion of the harmful humanitarian consequences of the
irrationality of knowledge-inquiry see Maxwell (1984, ch. 3).
7 See Maxwell (1998).
8 For very much more detailed presentations of the argument see Maxwell: (1976);
(1984); (1998); (2002a); and (2002b).